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Abstract
This paper shows that subsidising the cost of capital restricts the
ability of the poorest to participate in the group lending mechanisms
that offer opportunities to save. We document the group lending
mechanism used by a typical microfinance lender in Haryana, India.
We found that the groups have significant income heterogeneity within
them. Individuals can participate in the group either as a borrower
or a saver. The lender requires that the borrower partly self-finance’s
their project with their own cash wealth. Consequently, a borrower
requires a minimum amount of cash wealth to borrow. The poorest
participate in the group by co-financing the borrower’s project with
their meagre savings. In return, they obtain higher than market re-
turns on their savings. Subsidising the cost of capital reduces the cash
wealth required to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely,
it increases the cash wealth required to participate as a saver, thus
curtailing the opportunity for the poorest to enrich themselves.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we challenge the long held view in microfinance that subsidising
the cost of capital is the most effective way of helping the poorest. We find
the conditions under which subsidising the cost of capital may harm the
interest of the poorest.
The microfinance literature has hitherto mainly focussed on mechanisms
that allow the wealth-deprived (collateral-less) individuals to borrow in groups.
The liability they bear for each other within the group compensates for their
lack of ownership of stock assets that can serve as collateral. The literature,
with the exception of Banerjee et al. (1994), has ignored the implication of
offering saving opportunities within the group-mechanism.
Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, pp.172) highlights the chang-
ing attitudes toward offering saving opportunities when they write that “mi-
crofinance practitioner and policymakers are coming around to the view that
facilitating savings may often be more important than finding better ways to
lend to low income customers, especially for the most impoverished house-
holds . . . the two are complementary . . . ”
Whilst analysing the internal structure of a cooperative, where members
of the cooperative borrow both internally and externally, Banerjee et al.
(1994) show that a premium needs to be paid on the internally borrowed
funds. The net savers in the group-mechanism are thus compensated for
monitoring the net borrower’s actions and bearing the liability for the net
borrower’s failure to repay. Using this as a starting point, we analyse the
effect of offering saving opportunities within the group-mechanism on the
depth of outreach achieved by the mechanism.
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Depth of outreach is the mechanism’s ability to reach the poor. It depends
on the poorest person who is able to participate in the mechanism. The
poorer this person is, the greater the depth of outreach of the mechanism. We
differ in our approach from Banerjee et al. (1994), in that, our objective is to
evaluate the efficacy of the group mechanisms that offer saving opportunities,
in terms of their depth of outreach.
Using the data collected for the paper, we model the group-mechanism
used by Society for Promotion of Youth and Masses (SPYM), a typical mi-
crofinance lender in Haryana, India. The microfinance lender is part of the
Self-Help Group (SHG) Linkage Programme, India’s new national microfi-
nance programme.
The programme is quite unlike the operations of the large-scale micro-
finance lenders like BancoSol or Grameen Bank. Any small-scale microfi-
nance lender across the country can join the programme. The programme
is envisaged as a decentralised network of small-scale lenders with access to
preferential credit lines from the banking industry in the country. Using this
network of local lenders throughout the country, the aim of the programme
is the “provision of thrift, credit and other financial services . . . to the poor in
rural, semi-urban or urban areas, enabling them to raise their income levels
and improve [their] living standards.” (NABARD, 2000)
There has been a long tradition of ‘social and development banking’ in
India. Under its guise, the policymakers specify the proportion of credit
the banks in the country are required to direct towards ‘targeted’ areas.
By increasing or decreasing this proportion, the policymakers can effectively
augment or curtail the supply of loanable funds to the ‘targeted’ areas.
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Table 1: Group Leaders Proportion of Total Borrowing
(after 18 months of group formation)
Name of No. of No. not Total Average per Group Leaders’ Group Leaders’
Group Members borrowed Borrowing Borrower Borrowing Proportion
Sahil 17 7 135,500 16,938 70,500 52.03%
Poornima 16 5 107,800 9,800 30,000 27.83%
Rahim 17 9 28,000 3,500 7,500 26.79%
Shrikant 17 7 99,000 9,000 10,500 10.16%
Chahat1 16 6 65,000 5,458 2,000 1.16%
1 Chahat’s group leader were member of multiple groups and had borrowed from other groups.
The overarching aim of the SHG linkage programme is to funnel this
‘targeted’ credit to groups, through the local microfinance lenders. The local
lenders get access to capital from the banks, which they then lend on to
the groups. The policy of targeted credit implies that the profitable sectors
of the banking industry in India effectively cross-subsidises the ‘targeted’
areas. The question the paper addresses is whether this cross-subsidisation
enhances or deters the depth of outreach of the SHG Linkage Programme.
In our study of SPYM’s groups, we found three salient features. These
features are typical of the group-mechanism used by the microfinance lenders
in the SHG programme.
Firstly, the group members save a fixed amount every month which is
lent internally. Thus, the SHG mechanism offers its members opportunities
to save. A borrower pays 24% per annum for borrowing internally in the
group. On the other hand, the lender lends externally sourced funds to
the group members at 18% per anuum. Chavan and Ramakumar (2005)
4
Table 2: Demographics
All Members excl. Group Leaders
Members Group Leaders only
Sample Size 58 44 14
Household income 34,038 31,525 41,769
(21,855) (21,181) (22,935)
(per capita) 5,928 5,430 7,460
(4,200) (3,998) (4,597)
Household Size 6.44 6.51 6.21
(2.41) (2.48) (2.22)
standard errors in brackets, income in Rs. per annum
quote numerous sources like Harper (1998), Harper (2002), Gaiha (2001),
Puhazhendi and Satyasai (2000) and Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) which
show that premium on internal capital is a regular feature of such groups.
The lender decides on the amount each member saves per month as well
as the returns they get on their savings. In this way, the lender is able to
give the net savers in the group the requisite incentives to monitor the net
borrowers in the group. Each of the five SPYM groups which we studied,
had a significant proportion of net savers. Column 2 in Table 1 shows us
that, even after 18 months, a little less than half the members in each group
had not borrowed at all.
Second, the microfinance lender decides on the repayment schedule of the
loan. The lender requires that the borrowers pay back the principal in ten
equal installments. This implies that the interest payment is very high to
start with and decreases with time.1 The repayment schedule is too tightly
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structured to allow the borrowers to use only the returns from the project for
repayment. From our calculations in endnote 1, it is clear that the borrower
needs to finance a significant part of the repayment from her own cash wealth.
Jain and Mansuri (2003) suggest that the widespread use of these tightly
structured repayment schedules is to encourage the borrowers to repay by
borrowing from the informal sector. According to them, this allows the
microfinance institutions to incorporate the superior monitoring technology
of the informal sector in monitoring the borrowers. In our study, we did not
find any evidence that the group members were actively borrowing from the
local moneylender once they had joined the group. In our sample of the 58,
only 7 interviewees reported to have borrowed from the moneylender in the
recent past.
The hypothesis in this paper is that extracting the early repayment of the
loan is akin to requiring the borrower to partly self-invest in her own project.
This allows the lender to align the borrower’s interest with her own. Thus,
a borrower requires some cash wealth to be able to borrow.
The more tightly structured the repayment schedule, the greater the por-
tion of the project that is self financed by the borrower and therefore the
greater the cash wealth required to borrow. In our model, the lender decides
on the cash wealth the borrower is required to self-invest in her project in
order to borrow from the lender.
This matches the inference from Table 1 that the group leaders, whose
income levels are significantly higher than the rest of the group (see Table
2), dominate the credit in at least three of the five groups. Given that very
few interviewees reported owning any assets at all, we can take income levels
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as a proxy for wealth, which is held mainly in form of cash wealth.
The third salient feature was that there was significant income or wealth
heterogeneity within the groups. Every group had two group leaders who
had initiated the group. As mentioned above, without exception, these were
also the members with the highest income levels in the group. Further, these
relatively wealthy group leaders dominated the credit in the group. (See table
1). In a seminal paper, Ghatak (1999) has shown in an adverse-selection
framework that with joint liability, the borrowers flock together with their
own type. The safe-type group with the safe-type and the risky-type with
the risk-type of borrowers. The lender can screen the borrowers by varying
the interest rate and the degree of joint liability of the loan contract.
We observed a new dimension that influenced group formation in the
SPYM groups. Heterogenous groups were formed as the relatively wealthy
individuals grouped with the poorer individuals. Using the first two salient
features discussed above, the paper models the SHG mechanism in an at-
tempt to explain the heterogenous group formation.
We show that the relatively wealthy agents prefer to group with poorer
agents. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, the supply of credit is not
entirely elastic in the group. Second, given the tightly structured repayment
schedule, the borrowers require some cash wealth to be able to borrow. Thus,
when the relatively wealth borrowers group with poorer borrowers, there is
less competition in the group for credit. The poorest join the group to
participate just as savers.
Further, we analyse how the mechanism’s depth of outreach varies with
the cost of capital. We find that as the cost of credit is lowered through
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subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a borrower is reduced. Con-
versely, with subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a saver is higher.
Consequently, subsidy closes the gap between the wealth required to be a
saver and a borrower.
We find that there is an optimal cost of capital, at which, the poorest saver
in the group-mechanism has a definite probability of becoming a borrower
in the next period. This is possible if the saver can accumulate the requisite
wealth in one period.
If the policymakers have the ability to influence the cost of credit, they
should aim for this optimal rate. Thus, subsidy only helps the poor if the
cost of credit in the market is higher than this optimal rate. Conversely, if
the market cost of credit is lower than the optimal rate, subsidy can decrease
the depth of outreach.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We analyse
individual lending in Section 3 and group lending mechanism in Section 4.
Section 5 examines the interest rate policy, followed by the conclusions in
Section 6.
2 Model
Each agent has access to an identical project which requires a lump-sum
investment of 1 unit of capital. The project produces an uncertain and
observable outcome xi, valued at x¯ when it succeeds (s) and 0 when it fails
(f).
8
2.1 Environment
2.1.1 Agents
Each agent k is risk neutral, with zero reservation utility and wk cash wealth,
which cannot be used as collateral. Agents have no collateralizable wealth.
(wk < 1 ∀ k)
Agents may choose to pursue the project with a high (H) or low (L)
effort, which is unobservable to everyone except themselves. With a high
(low) effort, x¯ is realised with probability pih (pil) and 0 with 1− pih (1− pil).
(pih > pil)
By exerting a low effort, agents obtain a private benefit of value B from
the project which is non-pecuniary and non-transferable amongst the agents.
The private benefits can be curtailed by monitoring, which is undertaken at
cost c to the monitor.
The task of monitoring is also unobservable. The only connection that
agents have amongst themselves is their ability to monitor each other and
curtail each other’s private benefits. We impose the following assumptions
on the monitoring function B(c).
Assumption 1 (Monitoring function).
i. B(c) is continuous and twice differentiable
ii. B(0) > 0, B′(c) < 0, B′′(c) > 0;
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2.1.2 Lender
The lender is risk-neutral. The lender does not have the ability to monitor
or punish the agents in any way, except through their payoffs. The lender
can costlessly observe the initial capital invested in the project as well as the
output from the project.
2.1.3 Cost of Capital
The opportunity cost of capital for everyone in the area is ρ. The lender
has access to capital at ρ and the agents can obtain a return of ρ on their
savings. The lender faces competition and is unable to earn any rents on his
lending. Thus, the lender makes zero profit.
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2.1.4 Agent’s Payoff
The lender requires all loans be partly financed by another agent, who is a
peer of the first agent. Thus, agents form groups of two to borrow from the
lender. We call the agent undertaking the project the borrower. The agent
co-financing the project is called the saver.
The lender decides on three aspects of the contract that he offers the
group. Firstly, he sets out the extent to which the project should be co-
financed by the peer. Second, he sets out the rate of return the peer gets on
her capital used for co-financing the project. Third, he sets out the extent
to which the agent is required to self finance her project. This, in turn,
determines the amount of capital the lender would lend to the group. Even
though the lender specifies the rate of return on the capital he lends, it is
effectively bounded by his zero profit condition.
In a group contract, the saver is required to finance the borrower’s project
with ws. The borrower is required to self-invest wb in the project. The group
borrows the rest of the capital (1− ws − wb) from the lender.
If the project succeeds, the saver and lender get returns of R and r on
their capital. The borrower keeps the rest of the output.
Let si be the saver’s pecuniary payoff in state i = {s, f}.
ss = Rws
sf = 0
If the project succeeds, the savers gets Rws and if it fails she gets nothing.
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Let li be the lender’s payoff in state i.
ls = r(1− ws − wb)
lf = 0
The lender gets r(1−ws −wb) if the project succeeds and nothing if it fails.
Let bi be the borrower’s pecuniary payoff in state i.
bs = x¯− ss − ls
= x¯− Rws − r(1− ws − wb)
bf = 0
If the project succeeds, the borrower gets to keep whatever is left after paying
the saver and the lender. If the project fails, the output is zero and no one
gets anything.
3 Individual Lending
In this section, we examine the case where an individual borrower undertakes
a project by investing 1 unit of capital. The lender lends her (1 − wb) and
requires that she invest wb of her own cash wealth in the project.
3.1 First-Best
As a benchmark, we look at the perfect information case, where the lender
can observe the borrower’s effort. The lender will be willing to lend (1−wb)
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at interest rate r, if it solves the following problem:
max
wb
pihr(1−wb)
E [bi | H ] > ρwb (1)
bi > 0; i = s, f (2)
where ρ is the borrower’s and the lender’s opportunity cost of capital and bi,
the borrowers payoff in state i = {s, f}. If the project succeeds, the borrower
repays the lender r(1−wb), and keeps the rest of the output x¯ for herself. If
the project fail, she gets 0. Thus, bs = x¯− r(1− wb); bf = 0. The borrower’s
expected pecuniary payoff with effort level j is
E [bi | j] = pi
j [x¯− r(1−wb)] (3)
The participation constraint (1) gives us the minimum wealth required for
borrowing.
wb > −
[
x¯− r
r − ρ
pih
]
This does not bind for r ∈ [ ρ
pih
, x¯] if x¯ > ρ
pih
. It implies that even borrowers
with no wealth (wb = 0) can borrow from the lender if they have a socially
viable project.
We assume that the lender, due to the competition he faces, is unable
to obtain an ex ante return on the capital he lends, over and above his
opportunity cost of capital. Thus, the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC)
is satisfied if
pihr(1− wb) = ρ(1− wb)
r =
ρ
pih
(L-ZPC)
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At this interest rate, all the borrowers, irrespective of their wealth, can bor-
row. In the first-best world, where effort is observable, there is no minimum
wealth required for borrowing from the lender
wb > 0 (4)
if the project is socially viable, that is x¯ > ρ
pih
.
Proposition 1. If effort is observable and the project is socially viable, there
is no minimum wealth required to borrow from the lender.
3.2 Unobservable Effort
In the first-best world, there is no tension between r and wb because the effort
is observable and does not need to be incentivized. The tension between r and
wb emerges when the effort is unobservable and thus needs to be incentivized.
With unobservable effort, increasing r reduces the borrower’s incentive
for high effort.2 This can be compensated by increasing wb, the borrower’s
stake in her own project. Thus, given r, there is a minimum wb required
for the contract to be incentive compatible. Further, the minimum stake wb
required by the lender increases with r.
The lender’s zero profit condition requires that r = ρ
pih
. Consequently,
the minimum wb required for borrowing increases with ρ, the cost of capital.
3.2.1 Borrower’s Incentive Compatibility Constraint
We examine the case where the effort is unobservable. As mentioned earlier,
the lender is unable to monitor the borrower. We add the borrower’s incentive
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compatibility constraint to the lender’s problem from the previous section.
E[ bi | H ] > E[ bi | L ] +B(0)
which, using (3), can be written as
pih[ x¯− r(1−wb) ] > pi
l[ x¯− r(1−wb) ] +B(0) (5)
The borrower’s return from pursuing the project with high effort is given
by LHS and low effort by RHS. The RHS includes private benefits B(0)
associated with exerting low effort on the project. The condition ensures
that the borrower has the incentive to pursue the project with high effort.
As in the previous section, the participation constraint is satisfied for
all r ∈ [ ρ
pih
, x¯]. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (5) can be
written as
∆pix¯− B(0) > ∆pir(1−wb) (6)
where ∆pi = pih − pil. The LHS is the net social gain and the RHS is the
increase in the lender’s expected payoff, from the borrower’s high effort.
The borrower keeps whatever is left of the output after repaying the
lender. Consequently, according to (6), the borrower’s incentive for high
effort is maintained if the lender does not extract more than the net social
gain accruing to the borrower by exerting high effort.
The lender can extract the expected net social gain accruing to the bor-
rower by setting the right combination of r and wb. He can do this by setting
either a large enough r, or a small enough wb, that turns (6) into an equality.
Given that the lender is bound by the zero profit condition, he can only set
small enough wb that turns (6) into an equality.
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Thus, from the borrower’s incentive compatibility condition we get the
minimum wealth required to borrow.
wb > 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
∆pix¯−B(0)
∆pi
]
The RHS is the lower bound on the borrower’s wealth for a given ρ, the cost
of capital.
3.2.2 Contract
The lender’s objective function is decreasing in wb. Conversely, the borrower’s
incentive compatibility condition gives us the minimum wealth required to
borrow. In order to align the borrower’s incentive in his favour, the lender
requires the borrower to invest at least wb of her own cash wealth in the
project. The lender thus offers the borrower a contract (r,wI
b
) where
r =
ρ
pih
wI
b
= 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
∆pix¯− B(0)
∆pi
] (7)
The lender offers the individual borrowers a contract where they are required
to self-invest a specified amount of cash wealth into their project. We know
from the lender’s objective function that he would like to lend as much as he
can to the borrowers and would not let the borrowers invest more than that
specified by (7).
Proposition 2. The minimum wealth required to borrow from the lender
increases with the cost of capital and decreases with the productivity of the
project.
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b
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individuals 
that can 
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Figure 1: Individual Lending: Minimum Wealth Required
Figure 1 gives us the minimum wealth required to borrow from the lender
(wb), for a given ρ. As ρ increases, the borrower’s repayment obligation to the
lender increases, lowering her incentive for high effort. This is compensated
by requiring her to have a greater stake in her own project. Similarly, given
ρ, the larger the net social gain, ∆pix¯ − B(0), the lower the wealth required
to borrow.
Proposition 3. An agent with wealth greater than the wealth required to
borrow will accept the lender’s contract if her project is socially viable.
Any agent k with cash wealth wk > wb will accept the contract (r,wb)
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offered by the lender if
ρ (wk −wb ) + pi
h[ x¯− r(1−wb) ] > ρwk
The LHS gives us the return an agent k, with cash wealth wk, gets from
accepting the contract (r,wb). The RHS gives us her returns from refusing
the contract. With r = ρ
pih
, the above condition is reduced to one which
requires the project to be socially viable.
x¯ >
ρ
pih
3.2.3 Economic Rents
The borrower’s economic rent is given by
E[bi | H ]− ρwb = pi
h
[
x¯−
ρ
pih
]
The borrower gets an economic rent due the lender’s inability to punish her
through her payoff if the project fails. The economic rents decreases in the
cost of capital ρ and increase in the project productivity, x¯.
4 Group Lending
A group consists of two agents, a saver and a borrower. The borrower is
the agent that undertakes the project, and the saver, the agent that partly
co-finance’s the project.
The combined cash wealth of the borrower and the saver is less than the
initial capital required for the project. The group is formed with the purpose
of borrowing the rest of the capital from the lender to enable the borrower
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to undertake her project. The lender finances just one project per period per
group. The group is disbanded after the project concludes.
4.1 The Mechanism
The lender specifies the amount of wealth the borrower and the saver are
required to invest in the project. The borrower invests wb and the saver
invests ws in the project. The group borrows 1 − (ws + wb), rest of the
capital required for the project, from the lender.
w
b
w
s
1− w
s
− w
b 
Rr
Lender’s Capital Saver’s Capital Borrower’s CapitalSource of Capital
Cost of capital
0 1
Figure 2: Group Lending: Source and Cost of Capital
If the project succeeds, the savers gets a return R on her capital. The
lender gets a return r on his capital and the borrower keep the rest. Con-
versely, if the project fails, everyone gets 0.
4.1.1 Timing
The timing is as follows:
t=1 The Lender offers the group a group-contract.
• The saver gets a contract (ws,R) and the borrower gets a contract
(wb, r).
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t=2 The agents self-select into the roles of the saver and the borrower.
Subsequently, they pair up to form a group.
t=3 The group borrows (1−wb−ws) from the lender.
• The Borrower invests 1 unit of capital into the project.
t=4 The saver chooses her monitoring intensity c.
t=5 The borrower chooses her effort level.
t=6 The project outcome is realised.
• If the project succeeds, the output x¯ gets distributed as follows:
Saver: ss = Rws
Lender: ls = r
(
1− (ws +wb)
)
Borrower: bs = x¯− ls − ss
• If the project fails, the output is 0. Everyone gets 0
sf = lf = bf = 0
4.1.2 Final Expected Payoffs
The borrower’s final expected payoffs is
E[ bi | j ] +
[
pih − pij
pih − pil
]
B(c) =
pij
[
x¯− r(1− ws − wb)− Rws
]
+
[
pih − pij
pih − pil
]
B(c)
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where i = {s, f} indicates the success or the failure of the project and
j = {H,L} indicates the effort level the borrower exerts for the project. The
final expected payoffs of the saver is
E[ si | j ]− c =pi
jRws − c
where c is the intensity with which the saver monitors the borrower. The
final expected payoffs of the lender is
E[ li | j ] = (pi
jr − ρ) [ 1− wb − ws ]
An optimal contract gives the saver the incentive to monitor the borrower
with an intensity which is sufficient to induce the borrower to pursue the
project with a high effort level.
4.2 The Constraints
Due to competition, the lender faces the following zero profit condition
r =
ρ
pih
(L-ZPC)
We examine the borrower and saver’s participation and incentive com-
patibility constraint below.
4.2.1 Borrower
The borrower’s participation constraint is given by
pih [x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] > ρwb (B-PC)
The condition ensures that the borrower’s return from exerting high effort
level should not be less than the opportunity cost of her cash wealth wb
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invested in the project. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint is
given by
pih [x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws]
> pil [x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] +B(c) (B-ICC)
The condition ensures that the borrower has the requisite incentive to pursue
the project with a high effort.
4.2.2 Saver
The saver’s participation constraint is given by
pihRws − c > ρws (S-PC)
The condition ensures that the saver’s return from participating in the group
and monitoring with intensity c are not less then her returns from investing
ws in a safe asset.
The saver’s incentive compatibility constraint is given by
pihRws − c > pi
lRws (S-ICC)
The condition ensures that the saver’s return from inducing the borrower
to exert high effort on her project by monitoring with intensity c is not less
than the returns from monitoring with 0 intensity.
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4.3 Discussion
4.3.1 Borrower’s Decision
Given the contracts (R,ws) and (r,wb) that the lender offers the group, the
borrower exerts a high effort if the following condition is met.
∆pi[x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] > B(c) (B-ICC)
The gain in the borrower’s payoff from a high effort (∆pibs) should at least
compensate her for the lost private benefit B(c). This condition can be
rewritten as
wb > 1−
1
r
[
x¯−
B(c)
∆pi
]
+
(
R
r
− 1
)
ws (B-ICC)
Given the saver’s contract (R,ws), the borrower’s incentive compatibility
constraint gives us the the lower bound on wb, the minimum wealth required
by the borrower. Using the lender’s zero profit condition, the borrower’s
participation constraint can be rewritten as
pih
(
x¯−
ρ
pih
)
>
(
R−
ρ
pih
)
ws (B-PC)
The RHS is the premium that the saver gets on her saving ws. The condi-
tion restricts the total premium that the saver obtains and thus effectively
restricts the range of the saver’s contract (R,ws).
4.3.2 Saver’s Decision
There are two relevant ranges for R, the return the saver gets on her cap-
ital. In the first range, R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
, the saver’s participation constraint
binds and her incentive compatibility constraint remains slack. Thus, in this
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range, a saver’s contract (R,ws) that satisfies the saver’s participation con-
straint always satisfies her incentive compatibility constraint. Conversely, a
contract that satisfies the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint does not
necessarily satisfy her participation constraint.
In the second range, R > ρ
pil
, the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint
binds and her participation constraint remains slack. In this range, a contract
that satisfies the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint always satisfies her
participation constraint, though vice versa is not true. It is important to note
that this holds for all c > 0. (For details see the Appendix A.)
The saver’s participation and incentive compatibility are drawn for a pos-
itive value of c in Figure 3. A saver’s contract (R,ws) which is to the right
of the (S-PC) will satisfy the saver’s participation constraint. Similarly, a
saver’s contract which is to the right of (S-ICC) will satisfy the saver’s incen-
tive compatibility constraint. As c, the intensity of the monitoring increases,
both curves shift right, though they still continue to intersect at R = ρ
pil
.
As discussed above, the borrower’s participation constraint serves to re-
strict the saver’s contract. Thus, any contract which is to the left of the
(B-PC) in figure 3 will satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint.
A saver’s contract (R,ws) in the area ABCD will satisfy the saver’s
incentive compatibility and participation constraint as well as the borrower’s
participation constraint.
An optimal contract from the lender would give the saver the incentive to
monitor the borrower with a intensity that is sufficient to induce the borrower
to exert a high effort on the project. Thus, given an optimal contract (R,ws),
the saver will choose her monitoring intensity. If R is in the first range,
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Figure 3: Borrower’s and Saver’s Constraints
she would choose a monitoring intensity that would make her participation
constraint bind. If R is in the second range, she would choose a monitoring
intensity that would make her incentive compatibility constraint bind. A
detailed discussion follows in Appendix A.
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4.4 Lender’s Problem
The lender’s problem is
max φ = pihr(1−ws −wb)
subject to his zero profit condition, the saver’s and the borrower’s participa-
tion and incentive compatibility constraint.
The saver’s participation constraint binds in the first range, namely R ∈(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
and her incentive compatibility constraint binds in the second range,
R > ρ
pil
. In Appendix A we show that if c 6 pihx¯ − ρ, the borrower’s
incentive compatibility constraint will bind and her participation constraint
will be slack.3 Substituting (S-PC), (S-ICC), (B-ICC) and (L-ZPC) into the
lender’s objective function, the lender’s problem can be written as
max
R , c
φ (R , c) = pihr
[
1−
(
wb
(
R ,ws , c
)
+ws
(
R , c
) )]
Thus, the lender maximises his expected payoff by choosing a optimum R
and c. Given the optimum values for R and c, ws and wb can be obtained
from the respective saver’s and borrower’s constraints that bind for the saver
and the borrower.
In Appendix B, we show that the lender’s objective function φ (R, c) is
increasing with R in the first range, namely R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
. Conversely, in the
second range, R > ρ
pil
, the lender’s objective function is independent of R.
Further, for a given R, the lender’s objective function is maximised if the
lender induces the saver to monitor with intensity c given by
B′(c) = max

−

 pih − pil
pih −
ρ
R

 , −1

 (8)
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The function gives us the optimal value of c that the lender would like to
induce, for a given R, in order to maximise his objective function φ (R, c).
According to (8), the optimal c that the lender would like to induce
increases with R in the first range, namely R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
.
In the second range, R > ρ
pil
, the lender would like to induce the saver
to monitor with intensity c∗ defined by B(c∗) = −1. The optimal c in this
range is independent of R.
Given that (8) is continuous, the lender’s objective function is maximised
(unconditionally) if the contracts he offers the group meets the following
conditions.
R >
ρ
pil
(9)
B′(c∗) = −1 (10)
x¯ >
ρ
pih
+
c∗
pih
[
R− ρ
pih
∆piR
]
(11)
The lender can lend to a group with a project which satisfies (11) by
offering the saver a contract that would induce her to monitor with intensity
c∗ defined by (10). Further, he would have to offer her a R in the second
range.
As we discussed above, the value of R does not influence the lender’s
objective function in the second range. Thus, by setting R at its lowest
value in the second range, R = ρ
pil
, the lender can lend to all groups with
projects that meet the following condition
x¯ >
c∗ + ρ
pih
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For projects x¯ ∈
[
c∗+ρ
pih
, ∞
)
, the lender can induce the saver to monitor
with intensity c∗ by offering her a contract (R∗,w∗
s
) where
R∗ =
ρ
pil
w∗
s
=
1
R∗
c∗
∆pi
(12)
He offers the borrower a contract (r,w∗
b
) where
r =
ρ
pih
w∗
b
= 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(c∗)
∆pi
−
c∗
pih
]
(13)
We summarise this with the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For projects with x¯ ∈
[
ρ+c∗
pih
, ∞
)
, the lender induces the
saver to monitor with intensity c∗ by setting R = R∗ = ρ
pil
.
The proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition 5. The minimum wealth required to borrow in group lending is
lower than in individual lending.
In individual lending, the minimum wealth required to borrow is given
by
wI
b
= 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(0)
∆pi
]
(14)
In group lending, the minimum wealth required to borrow is given by
w∗
b
= 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(c∗)
∆pi
−
c∗
pih
]
(15)
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where B(c∗) = −1. Comparing (14) with (15), we get
wI
b
> w∗
b
given that B(0) > B(c∗) + c∗.
4.5 Group Formation
Proposition 6. An agent with enough wealth to be a borrower in the group
will always prefer to pair up with an agent who has enough wealth to be a
saver but not a borrower and vice versa.
Agent k with cash wealth wk > w
∗
b
will always prefer to pair up with an
agent n whose cash wealth wn is in the range [w
∗
s
, w∗
b
).
If agent k with cash wealth wk > w
∗
b
pairs-up with agent n with cash
wealth wn ∈ (w
∗
s
, w∗
b
), she can be sure that she would be able to borrow
from the lender. Thus, her payoff from this pairing is given by
ρ(wk −w
∗
b
) + E[bi | H ] (16)
Pairing up with an agent h with cash wealth wh > w
∗
b
, would imply
that she would have to compete with agent n to become the borrower in the
group. If it is randomly decided which agent in the group gets to borrow,
agent k could get the role of a borrower or a saver in the group with equal
probability. Agent k’s payoff from pairing with Agent h is given by
1
2
[
ρ(wk −w
∗
b
) + E[bi | H ]
]
+
1
2
[
ρ(wk −w
∗
s
) + E[si | H ]− c
∗
]
(17)
In Appendix B.2, we show that for the optimal contract (r , w∗
b
) and
(R , w∗
s
) given by (12) and (13), the borrower’s and the saver’s rents are
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given by
E[bi | H ]− ρw
∗
b
= pih(x¯− r)− c∗
E[si | H ]− ρw
∗
s
− c∗ = 0
Comparing (16) with (17), agent k would prefer to pair up with agent n over
agent h if the following condition holds
pih
(
x¯−
ρ
pih
)
− c∗ > −ρw∗
s
The condition always holds for projects x¯ ∈
[
c∗+ρ
pih
, ∞
)
.
Similarly an agent n with wealth wn ∈ [w
∗
s
,w∗
b
) would prefer to pair
up with an agent k with wealth wk > w
∗
b
over another agent l with wealth
wl ∈ [w
∗
s
,w∗
b
) if the following condition holds.
[
ρ(wn −w
∗
s
) + E[si | H ]− c
∗
]
> ρwn (18)
Agent n’s final payoff from pairing up with agent k with wealth (wk > w
∗
b
)
is given by the LHS and agent l with wealth (wl  w∗b) is given by the RHS.
Given that (18) holds with an equality, it leaves agent n indifferent between
the two choices.
5 Interest Rate Policy
In this section we examine the role of the interest rate policy. We analyse
the cost and benefits of influencing the cost of capital in terms of its effect
on the depth of the outreach or the ability of the group-lending mechanism
to reach the poorest.
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Given the competition amongst the lenders, if a particular lender gets
funds at a subsidised cost, he would just end up retaining the subsidy in the
form of rents for himself. He would not have any incentive to pass on the
benefits of the subsidy to the agents participating in the group.
Consequently, the only way in which the policymaker can intervene in
this market is by augmenting the supply of loanable funds. This would have
the effect of lowering the cost of capital or decreasing ρ in the particular
market. We assume that the policymaker’s ability to influence ρ is limited.
She can influence ρ by a small amount, δ in either direction.
The policy maker cares about the depth of outreach or the ability of
the group-lending mechanism to reach the wealth deprived. Her objective
is to minimise the amount of cash wealth required by an agent to access
the financial services offered by the group-lending mechanism. A agent k
with wealth wk can participate in the group lending mechanism if wk >
min (w∗
s
+w∗
b
).
Definition 1 (Depth of Outreach). The depth of outreach is measured by
min (w∗
s
+w∗
b
)
.
The depth of outreach increases as min(w∗
s
+w∗
b
) decreases.
5.1 Subsidising the Cost Of Capital
We examine the effect of subsidising the cost capital on the wealth required
to participate in the group as a saver and as a borrower.
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Proposition 7. Subsidising the cost of capital decreases the wealth required
to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely, it increases the wealth
required to participate in the group as a saver.
Given the cost of capital ρ, the minimum wealth required to be a borrower
in a group is given by
w∗
b
= 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(c∗)
∆pi
−
c∗
pih
]
The minimum wealth required to be a saver in the group is given by
w∗
s
=
pil
ρ
c∗
∆pi
To examine the effect of subsidising the cost of capital on the group
lending contract, we look at the first derivatives of w∗
s
and w∗
b
with respect
to ρ.
dw∗
s
dρ
= −
[
pil
∆pi
c∗
ρ2
]
< 0
Thus, decreasing ρ or subsidising the cost of capital decreases w∗
b
, which in
turns allows poorer agents to become borrowers in the group.
dw∗
b
dρ
=
pih
ρ2
[
x¯−
B(c∗)
∆pi
−
c∗
pih
]
> 0
Conversely, decreasing ρ increases w∗
s
. This implies that the minimum
cash wealth required to participate in the group as a saver has increased.
Overall, (w∗
s
+w∗
b
), the combined group’s wealth required by the lender
increases with ρ.
d (w∗
s
+w∗
b
)
dρ
=
pih
ρ2
[
x¯−
B(c∗)
∆pi
−
c∗
∆pi
]
> 0
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As ρ increases, the increase in w∗
b
is greater than the decrease in w∗
s
. With
increasing ρ, the policymaker gets a greater depth of outreach. At the same
time, some agents that could have borrowed at the lower ρ would not be able
to borrow now. They would have to participate as savers.
Proposition 8. There exists a ρˆ, such for ρ 6 ρˆ, the savers are able to ac-
cumulate enough wealth to be able to borrow in the next period, if the current
project succeeds.
If the current projects succeeds, the savers of this period can accumulate
enough cash wealth to borrow in the next period if the following condition
is met.
w∗
s
R∗ > w∗
b
(19)
This holds for all values of ρ that satisfy the following constraint
ρ 6
pih
[
x¯− B(c
∗)
∆pi
− c
∗
pih
]
1− c
∗
∆pi
= ρˆ
ρˆ is the optimal ρ for allowing the poorest agents to escape the poverty
trap. It maximises depth of outreach subject to the constraint (19).
With ρ = ρˆ, the poorest agents with sufficient wealth to be savers in this
period can hope to become borrowers with the probability pih in the next
period. This would start a process by which pih proportion of all savers in
this period would become borrowers in the next period and pair up with
agents aspiring to be savers. This process would be particularly helpful if
wealth distribution is skewed and the relatively wealthy agents with cash
wealth wk > w
∗
b
are in short supply.
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Thus, on one hand, as ρ increases, depth of outreach increases. On the
other hand, with a increasing ρ, the gap between w∗
s
and w∗
b
also increases
making it more difficult for the poorest in the groups to bridge the gap.
Thus, if ρ in the market is greater than ρˆ, then subsidy is warranted.
Conversely, if ρ in the market is less than ρˆ, the policymaker should curtail
the supply of funds and drive up the cost of capital towards ρˆ.
6 Conclusion
We documented the group lending mechanism of a typical microfinance lender
in India’s SHG Linkage Programme. All the agents are poor and have no
collateralizable assets. Given their inability to bear any liability for failure,
the mechanism requires that the borrower partly self-finance’s the project
with her own cash wealth. This helps the lender align the borrower’s incentive
with his own. A borrower requires certain cash wealth to be able to borrow.
The lender specifies the cash wealth required to participate in the group
as either a saver or a borrower. The poorest take on the role of savers in the
group. Agents with sufficient wealth to borrow take on the role of borrowers
in the group.
By allowing saving opportunities and restricting the number of borrowers
per group per period, the mechanism gives the agents an incentive to group
across wealth levels. We showed that the relatively wealthy agents, who have
sufficient wealth to borrow, prefer to pair up with the relatively poor agents.
This is because the poorest agents, with insufficient wealth to borrow, will
not compete for the loans in the group.
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The lender gives the savers the requisite incentives to monitor the bor-
rower. The monitoring by the saver induces the borrower to exert a high effort
level on her project. Even though the savers get zero rents, the mechanism
allows the saver to get a premium on her savings in return for her monitoring
effort. Thus, if the project succeeds, the savers are able to increase their cash
wealth.
We showed that if the cost of capital is subsidised or lowered, the wealth
required to be a borrower decreases with it and the wealth required to become
a saver increases with it. Thus, subsidy actually limits the ability of the
mechanism to reach the poorest. On the other hand, subsidy also closes the
gap between the wealth required to be a saver and the wealth required to be
a borrower. Closing the gap is helpful in letting the current savers become
the next period’s borrowers.
We found that there was an optimal cost of capital where the wealth
required to be a saver was minimised subject to the constraint that the
savers could transform themselves into borrowers in one period with a definite
probability. Thus, if the policymaker’s have an ability to influence the cost
of capital, they should try to push the cost of capital towards this optimal
rate. Thus, to answer the question in the title, subsidy only helps the poorest
if the cost of capital is above this rate. Conversely, if the cost of capital is
below the optimal rate, subsidy would harm the interest of the poorest by
excluding them from the group lending mechanism.
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A Group Lending: Saver’s Contract
A.1 Saver’s Constraints
Saver’s participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint
are
pihRws − c > ρws (S-PC)
pihRws − c > pi
lRws (S-ICC)
These constraints can be written as
ws
(
R−
ρ
pih
)
>
c
pih
(S-PC)
Rws >
c
∆pi
(S-ICC)
For the saver’s constraints, there are two relevant ranges for R. In the
first range, R ∈ ( ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
), the saver’s participation constraint binds and the
incentive compatibility constraint is slack. This is because a saver’s con-
tract (R ,ws) that satisfies the participation constraint always satisfies the
incentive compatibility constraint in this range, but not vice-versa.
In the second range, R > ρ
pil
, the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint
binds and the saver’s participation constraint is slack. Again, this is because
a saver’s contract (R ,ws) that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint
always satisfies the participation constraint in this range, but not vice-versa.
As c increases, the curves (S-PC) and (S-ICC) in figure 3 shift towards
the right. It is important to note that for all c > 0 the two curves continue
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to intersect at R = ρ
pil
. This implies that the two ranges do not depend on c.
Further, the saver’s participation constraint binds on the first range and her
incentive compatibility constraint binds on the second range for any c > 0.
The range R ∈ (0, ρ
pih
] is irrelevant. In this range the saver’s participation
cannot be satisfied for any non-negative combination of R and ws.
In the first range, the saver does not get any rents given that her participa-
tion constraint binds. Her contract (R,ws) is always on the her participation
constraint. In the second range, her rent increases with R.
As we can see from Figure 3, the saver gets no rent along the segment
AB in the first range. As R increases in the second range along the segment
BC, the saver moves away from her participation constraint. As she moves
away, her rent starts increasing. The saver’s rent increases as the distance
between the saver’s contract and her participation constraint increases.
A.2 Borrower’s Participation Constraint
The borrower’s participation constraint is given by
pih [x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] > ρwb (B-PC)
which can be written as
x¯− r > (R− r)ws (B-PC)
This condition restricts the range of the saver’s contract. In figure 3, all
contracts to the left of the curve B-PC satisfy the borrower’s participation
constraint.
Thus the three curves (S-PC), (S-ICC) and (B-PC) give us the area
ABCD in figure 3. A saver’s contract in this area would satisfy the three
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constraints. It may be noted that the area ABCD starts contracting if either
c or ρ increase. Similarly, the area contracts if x¯ decreases.
For the area ABCD to exist, we need a condition that ensures that (B-
PC) is not on the left of (S-PC). We also need to find conditions under which
the (S-ICC) and (B-PC) intersect.
A.2.1 Existence of R¯
As the saver’s contract (R,ws) moves down the segment BC in figure 3, the
saver’s rent increases. Concomitantly, the borrower’s rent decreases. At C,
the borrower gets no rent and the saver ends up getting all the rent. Conse-
quently, any R > R¯ will not satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint.
R¯ is defined by the intersection of the borrower’s participation constraint
and the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint.
R¯ =


r
1−
[
(x¯−r)
c
∆pi
] if c > ∆pi(x¯− r),
@ if c 6 ∆pi(x¯− r).
(20)
(20) implies that R¯ exists only for a low-productivity high-monitoring
combination.
Given a project’s productivity x¯, a monitoring intensity c < ∆pi(x¯−r) can
be induced without driving the borrower’s rent to zero. For higher monitoring
intensity c > ∆pi(x¯− r), the maximum return the saver can be given on her
capital is given by R¯.
38
A.2.2 Maximum Monitoring
We derive the upper bound on the monitoring intensity c from the borrower’s
and the saver’s participation constraint.
(x¯− r) > ws
(
R−
ρ
pih
)
>
c
pih
The borrower’s participation constraint gives us the first inequality and the
saver’s participation constraint gives us the second inequality. The maxi-
mum monitoring that can be induced for a project is given by the following
inequality.
c 6 pih(x¯− r)
To summarise, the set of all the saver’s contracts (R,ws) which satisfies
the saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraint along with
the borrower’s participation constraint are given by
ws > max
[
c
pihR− ρ
,
c
∆piR
]


∨R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, R¯
]
if c ∈
(
∆pi(x¯− r) , pih(x¯− r)
]
∨R ∈
(
ρ
pih
,∞
)
if c ∈
(
0 , ∆pi(x¯− r)
]
where R¯ is given by (20).
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B Group Lending: Lender’s problem
Proof for Proposition 4.
The lender’s problem is
max
R,c
pihr
(
1− (ws + wb)
)
subject to pih [x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] > ρwb (B-PC)
pih[x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] >
pil[x¯− r(1−ws −wb)−Rws] +B(c) (B-ICC)
pihRws − c > ρws (S-PC)
pihRws − c > pi
lRws (S-ICC)
r =
ρ
pih
(L-ZPC)
Using the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC) the borrower’s partici-
pation constraint can be written as
pih
(
x¯−
ρ
pih
)
>
(
R−
ρ
pih
)
ws (B-PC)
The saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints can be
written as
(
pihR− ρ
)
ws > c (S-PC)
∆piRws > c (S-ICC)
As discussed in the previous section, We can summarise the three con-
straints above, namely the saver’s participation and incentive compatibility
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constraint and the borrower’s participation constraint, with
ws > max
[
c
(pihR− ρ)
,
c
∆piR
]
∨ c 6 pih(x¯−
ρ
pih
) (21)
There are two relevant ranges for R. In the first range, R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
)
, the
(S-PC) binds and (S-ICC) is slack. In the second range, R > ρ
pil
, the (S-ICC)
binds and (S-PC) is slack. The (B-PC) is satisfied if c 6 pih(x¯− ρ
pih
).
Using the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC), the borrower’s incentive
compatibility constraint can be written as
wb > 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(c)
∆pi
]
+
1(
ρ
pih
) (R− ρ
pih
)
ws (22)
Substituting (21) and (22) in the lender’s objective function can be writ-
ten as a function of R and c.
φ = pihr
[
1−
(
wb
(
R ,ws , c
)
+ws
(
R , c
) )]
=


pihx¯− pih
(
B(c)
∆pi
+
c
pih − ρ
R
)
for ρ
pih
< R 6 ρ
pil
pihx¯− pih
(
B(c) + c
∆pi
)
for R > ρ
pil
(23)
For the first range, R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
)
, we find that
∂φ
∂R
=
pihρc
(pihR− ρ)2
> 0 ∀ c > 0
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∂φ
∂c
= −pih

B′(c)
∆pi
+
1
pih −
ρ
R




> 0 if B′(c) < −

 pih − pil
pih −
ρ
R


6 0 if B′(c) > −

 pih − pil
pih −
ρ
R


∂φ2
∂c2
= −pih
(
B′′(c)
∆pi
)
< 0
∂φ2
∂c ∂R
= −pih
(
ρ
pihR− ρ
)
< 0
For the second range, R > ρ
pil
, we find that
dφ
dc
= 0 ⇒ B′(c) = −1
d2φ
dc2
=
pih
∆pi
B′′(c) < 0
The optimal c as a function of R is given by the following function
B′(c) = max

−

 pih − pil
pih −
ρ
R

 , −1

 (24)
Consequently, the lender’s objective function, φ = pihr
[
1−
(
ws +wb
)]
,
is maximised by the following set of conditions
R >
ρ
pil
∀ x¯ ∈
[
ρ+c∗
pih
, ∞
)
where B′(c∗) = −1
R =
ρ
pih +
∆pi
B′(c˜)
∀ x¯ ∈
(
ρ
pih
, c
∗+ρ
pih
)
where c˜ = pihx¯− ρ
(25)
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B.1 Contracts
For projects with x¯ ∈
[
ρ+c∗
pih
, ∞
)
, the lender induces monitoring c∗ by setting
R = R∗ = ρ
pil
. Thus, the saver would be offered a contract (R∗ ,ws
∗ ) and
the borrower would be offered a contract ( r ,wb
∗ ) where
R∗ =
ρ
pil
ws
∗ =
1
R∗
c∗
∆pi
r =
ρ
pih
wb
∗ = 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(c∗)
∆pi
−
c∗
pih
]
(26)
For projects with x¯ ∈
(
ρ
pih
, c
∗+ρ
pih
)
the lender induces monitoring c˜ < c∗ by
setting R = R˜ < R∗. Thus, the saver would be offered a contract ( R˜ , w˜s )
and the borrower would be offered a contract ( r , w˜b ) where
R˜ =
ρ
pih +
∆pi
B′(c˜)
w˜s =
1
R˜
c˜
∆pi
r =
ρ
pih
w˜b = 1−
1(
ρ
pih
)
[
x¯−
B(c˜)
∆pi
−
c˜
pih
(
−1
B′(c˜)
)]
(27)
For projects x¯ ∈
(
ρ
pih
, c
∗+ρ
pih
)
, the lender is not able to induce monitor-
ing intensity c∗. This is because the saver’s contract (R∗ ,ws
∗ ), which is
required to induce the saver to monitor with intensity c∗ would not satisfy
the borrower’s participation contract.
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B.1.1 Low Productivity Project and Borrower Participation Con-
straint
Lets suppose that for a project x¯ ∈
(
ρ
pih
, c
∗+ρ
pih
)
the lender tries to induce the
saver to monitor with intensity c∗ by offering her a contract (R∗ ,ws
∗ ). The
contract would satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint if
x¯−
ρ
pih
> (R∗ −
ρ
pih
)ws
∗
⇒ x¯ >
c∗ + ρ
pih
Thus contradicting the initial assumption about the project.
B.2 Economic Rents
Economic rents obtained by the borrower in group lending are given by
E[bi | H ]− ρwb = pi
h [x¯− r(1− ws − wb)−Rws]− ρwb
= pih [x¯− r − (R− r)ws]
(28)
Economic rents obtained by the saver in group lending are given by
E[si | H ]− ρws − c = pi
hRws − c− ρws
= (pihR − ρ)ws − c


= 0 ∀ R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
> 0 ∀ R > ρ
pil
(29)
In the first range, R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
, the saver gets zero rent as her participation
constraint binds. In the second range, R > ρ
pil
, the saver gets non-negative
rents as her participation constraint is slack.
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Using (28) and (29), we it is clear that in the first range, R ∈
(
ρ
pih
, ρ
pil
]
,
the total rents obtained by the saver and the borrower are decreasing in R.
E[bi | H ]− ρwb + E[si | H ]− ρws − c = pi
h[x¯− r − (R− r)ws]
Conversely, in the first range, R > ρ
pil
, the total rents obtained by the saver
and the borrower are constant for a given c.
E[bi | H ]− ρwb + E[si | H ]− ρws − c = pi
h(x¯− r)− c
Thus, R just serves the purpose of transferring rents from the borrower to
the saver. For the optimal contract (r,w∗
b
) and (R,w∗
s
) given by (26) in the
previous section, the rents are given by
E[bi | H ]− ρw
∗
b
= pih(x¯− r)− c∗
E[si | H ]− ρw
∗
s
− c∗ = 0
For the optimal contract (r, w˜b) and (R, w˜s) given by (27) in the previous
section, the rents are given by
E[bi | H ]− ρw˜b = pi
h(x¯− r)− c˜
E[si | H ]− ρw˜s − c˜ = 0
The borrower gets all the rent and the saver gets zero rent.
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Notes
1Most group members borrowed to buy buffaloes. For a typical loan of Rs. 10,000 at
24% per annum, the borrower was required to repay Rs. 1200 in the first month. Even if
the buffalo starting producing milk from the very first day, the borrower would still have
a shortfall of Rs. 450 in the first month. This is assuming that the buffalo produces 5 kgs
of milk a day which sells at Rs. 5 a kg. The shortfall in the tenth month would be of Rs.
270.
2Increasing r reduces the borrowers expected pecuniary payoff from high effort ( pih[x¯−
r(1 −wb)] ) more than from the low effort ( pi
l[x¯− r(1 − wb)] ), given that pi
h > pil. This
reduces her incentive to pursue the project with high effort and lose B(0), the private
benefits associated with low effort.
3For low productivity project, namely x¯ ∈
(
ρ
pih
,
c∗+ρ
pih
)
, the borrower’s participation
and incentive compatibility constraints would simultaneously bind.
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